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Rock: The Employer's
Right to Halt Operation Permanently or Temporarily
NOTES

Shifting the burden of proof appears to this writer to offer a
simple path to a more just and consistent treatment of the slip-andfall case. Admittedly, shifting any portion of the burden of proof
is not a simple step. Yet, it has been done in the past through various
devices, including statutory reform.80
Whether this particular solution is adopted is not the main
issue, however. The larger issue is whether outdated concepts of
liability and proof will be allowed to continue in the supermarket
setting. In Justice Terrell's words: "In light of the disparity between
the modern food market and the old time grocery, it is out of the
question to contend that they are governed by the same rules of
care." 8 '
ROBERT J. CARROLL

THE EMPLOYER'S RIGHT TO HALT OPERATIONS
PERMANENTLY OR TEMPORARILY
In three recent cases decided by the United States Supreme Court,
Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing Co.,'
American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 2 and NLRB v. Brown,3 the
employer's right to shut down his plant has, purportedly, been clarified and strengthened. Darlington dealt with a complete termination
and liquidation of plant assets after a union had won an election.
American Ship pertained to an employer's ability to discontinue
operations temporarily as a bargaining wedge against a union, which
had been certified and was seeking to renew its contract. Brown is
80. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §768.05 (1963); FLA. STAT. §769.02 (1963); FLA. STAT.
§§674.01-676.54 (1963).
81. Carl's Mfkts., Inc. v. De Feo, 55 So. 2d 182, 185 (Fla. 1951).
1. 85 Sup. Ct. 994 (1965).
2. 85 Sup. Ct. 955 (1965).
3. 85 Sup. Ct. 980 (1965).
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similar to American Ship in that employees were locked out during
contract renewal negotiations, but the case involved a multiemployer
bargaining unit, which locked out the employees when one of the
members had been struck. All members of the unit continued to
operate with temporary replacements. The lockout in American Ship
occurred after a bargaining impasse, but before a strike by the union.
As a result of these three recent decisions, the employer can exert
stronger economic pressure to support his bargaining position, provided he falls within the guidelines set out and heeds the caveats
contained therein.
The purpose of this note is to discuss the ramifications and ancillary labor problems and answers each presents, centering on the
employer's right to cease work. The primary concern is the relationship and balance between the preservation of the union and economic self help measures available to the employer. The employer
has other tactics of an economic nature 4 but none are as dramatic
or as effective as the cessation of work. The process of collective
bargaining contemplates negotiation without resort to measures that
may impose economic hardship.5 The collective bargaining process
has nevertheless been recognized as "industrial warfare.''6 Thus, the
question of permissible measures and of balancing respective interests
is all important without escalation to the level where either party
runs afoul of the strictures imposed by the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).7
THE

DarlingtonCASE

Darlington Manufacturing Company employed over 500 individuals. It was something of the typical textile plant located in the
Carolinas, with the town built around it. In 1956, the union began
organizational activity. A majority of the Darlington Manufacturing
Company stock was held by Deering Milliken 8c Company which
Roger Milliken controlled. The Milliken family, through this
parent corporation, operated a vast textile enterprise and marketed
4.

NLRB v. Brown, 85 Sup. Ct. 980, 984 (1965)

(dictum) (stockpiling inven-

tories, readjusting contract schedules, or transferring work to another plant);
NLRB v. Crompton-Highland Mills, 337 U.S. 217, 224 (1949) (dictum) (unilateral
changes in employment terms after impasse reached); NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (right to fire and replace economic strikers); NLRB
v. Tex-Tan, Inc., 318 F.2d 472, 479-82 (5th Cir. 1963) (allowing unilateral imposition of terms); Comment, 76 HARV. L. REv. 1494, 1497 (1963) (filling advance
orders or speedup in concluding days of contract).
5. Duvin, The Bargaining Lockout: An Impatient Warrior, 40 NOTRE DANIE
LAW. 137, 139 (1965).

6.
7.

American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct. 955, 977 (1965).
61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158 (1958).
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the products of twenty-seven mills. This corporate control structure
becomes relevant in later developments in the case.
The union was successful in the representation election. On
learning the outcome of the election, Roger Milliken called a meeting
of the board of directors. The directors voted to liquidate the
corporation, and shareholder approval was obtained five weeks later.
Two months after the election all operations ceased, and one month
later all machinery and equipment were sold. Darlington Manufacturing Company was no longer a going concern. The union filed
charges alleging discriminating activity in the closing and a refusal to bargain.8 The company advanced eight reasons 9 for the
closing of the plant, but during the NLR.B proceedings evidence was
adduced that Roger Milliken had admitted the unionization of the
employees was the dominant factor.' 0 The National Labor Relations
Board found the dosing to be an unfair labor practice" because of
Roger Milliken's antiunion animus. The court of appeals set aside
the Board's order.' 2 On review in the Supreme Court, it was declared
that an individual employer has the absolute right to go out of business, regardless of his reason.' 3 The case was remanded, however, for
a factual determination of the purpose and effect of the closing in relation to the employees in the other plants comprising the DeeringMilliken group.
The closing will be a discriminatory unfair labor practice if two
elements are found. First, Roger Milliken must have closed down
the Darlington plant with an intent to discourage unionization in
the other plants in which he had a substantial interest; further he
must have anticipated realizing some benefit from this discouragement.24 Second, he must have reasonably foreseen that the employees

of the other plants would fear losing their jobs if they persisted in
union organizational activity. The Darlington Manufacturing Company controversy arose in 1956, and it may be years before it is finally
resolved. Its significance at this point, however, is the pronouncement
of an individual employer's absolute right to liquidate:'5
8. National Labor Relations Act §§8 (a)(1), (3), (5), as amended, 61 Stat. 140
(1947); 29 U.S.C. §§158 (a) (1), (3), (5) (1958).
9. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 245 (1962).
10. Id. at 244.
11. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241 (1962).
12. Darlington Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963).
13. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 994, 998
(1965).
14. Id. at 1002. The Board has ordered a reopening of the record for the
presentation of evidence on the purpose and effect of the closing; 60 LAB. REL.
REP. No. 17, 139, News &"Background Information (Nov. 1, 1965).

15. Id. at 999.
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A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to
go out of business if he wants to would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be entertained without the
clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial precedent so construing the Labor Act. We find neither.
The employer's right to completely liquidate and go out of business, regardless of his motivation, was a question of first impression
for the Supreme Court in Darlington.16 The Board found no case

clearly supporting Milliken's claim' 7 but there had been dicta in
decisions of some courts of appeals.' 8 An article by a former general
counsel of the NLRB pointed out that the Board had required substantial evidence of economic justification before it could be persuaded that the closing of a plant was not for discriminatory reasons.' 9
As long as the employer was not trying to avoid his obligations under
the NLRA, the Board would not critically analyze the soundness of
the employer's reasoning. It was a matter of quanta of evidence for
economically justifying a shutdown. Thus, when a preponderance of
the evidence established that the employer would not have shut down
but for unionization of his employees, then the closing was a sections
8 (a) (1) and (3) violation.2° The Board approach must now be
modified because the Court in Darlington said a single employer may
now discontinue his entire business for any reason he pleases. 2 ' This
decree may be weakened if on remand it is found that Milliken fits the
new test 22 because the statement will then be only dictum, with the

Darlington Manufacturing Company shutdown amounting to a partial
closing to discourage unionization.
The Court reaffirmed the status of the law that a single employer
cannot cease a portion of his operations for the purpose of "chilling
unionism." 2 3 This will not disturb the cases that have found employer
unfair labor practices when the employer was hostile to unionization
because he had, for example, eliminated the messenger-delivery service
16. Ibid.
17. Darlington Mfg. Co., 139 N.L.R.B. 241, 250 (1962).
18. NLRB v. New Madrid Mfg. Co., 215 F.2d 908, 914 (8th Cir. 1954); Morand
Bros. Beverage Co. v. NLRB, 190 F.2d 576, 582 (7th Cir. 1951).
19. Rothman, The Right To Go Out of Business Together With a Consideration of Plant Removal, Subcontracting, and the Duty To Bargain, 6 BOSTON
COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL & COMMERCIAL L. REv.

20.

Casing
(1960).
21.
(1965).
22.
23.

1, 6 (1964).

See, e.g., Freda Redmond, 149 N.L.R.B. No. 100 (1964); Nevada Tank &

Co., 131 N.L.R.B. 1352 (1961); Barbers Iron Foundry, 126 N.L.R.B. 30
Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 994, 998
Id. at 1002.
Ibid.
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in a bank,24 discontinued the body and fender repair section in an
automotive dealership,25 or laid off carpenters in a home construction
business,26 after the employees in the respective sections had elected
a union to represent them. Nor will Darlington affect the outcome
of cases in which, in the face of organizational activity, an employer
that is not openly antiunion violates the NLRA by discontinuing
intrastate bus service but retaining the interstate operation 27 or by
stopping the wholesale and continuing the retail aspect of a laundry
service.28
The prior Board decisions and cases that have allowed the severance of a department did so only when there was no antiunion bias
shown and there were compelling business reasons. Lacking a motive
to "chill unionism," these cases are unaffected. An employer has been
able to sell five of his six stores, 29 or cancel a night shift 3° without
invoking the sanctions of the NLRA. In this context, it is still unclear
if the mere fact of unionization, with its economic ramifications, can
be a- valid factor to consider if the employer wants to eliminate or
subcontract out that function. Are not potentially increased labor
costs an economic factor in determining the future profitability of a
division of one's operations? It would be unrealistic and contrary to
"industrial realities" not to allow unionization to be a legitimate economic consideration, although the ceasing of that operation may inhibit organizational activity. Unionization has been recognized as
a valid economic factor to consider, if coupled with other business
reasons, when it has also been shown that the employer was not
s
hostile to unions.3
The rationale of a partial closing to "chill unionism" should not be extended to alter this.
The Darlington case has caught the eye or raised the ire of many
commentators. 32 But outside of after-dinner discussion or Bar Committee mention, what practical value will the decision have for those
24.

NLRB v. Bank of America, 130 F.2d 624 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 318 U.S.

791 (1942).

25. Williams Motor Co. v. NLRB, 128 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1942).
26. NLRB v. Kelly & Picerne, Inc., 298 F.2d 895 (1st Cir. 1962).
27. NLRB v. Missouri Transit Co., 250 F.2d 261 (8th Cir. 1957).
28. NLRB v. Savoy Laundry, Inc., 327 F.2d 370 (2d Cir. 1964).
29. Weingarten Food Center of Tenn., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 256 (1962) (decision
to sell comes under §8 (a) (5)).
30. NLRB v. Piedmont Cotton 'Mills, 179 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1950) (decision to
cancel comes under §8 (a) (5)).
31. See, e.g., Jays Food, Inc. v. NLRB, 292 F.2d 317 (7th Cir. 1961); NLRB
v. Lassing, 284 F.2d 781 (6th Cir. 1960); NLRB v. R. C. Mahon Co., 269 F.2d 44
(6th Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Adkins Transfer Co., 226 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1955); NLRB
v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954).
32. Johannesen, Case of The Runaway Mills: Darling Manufacturing Company, 12 LAB. L.J. 1189 (1961); Schoener, Case of the Runaway Author: Professor
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deeply involved in day-to-day labor relations? Few truly "single"
employers would contemplate complete liquidation just to avoid
dealing with a union. To stop everything and start anew in a different locale or line of work seems rather drastic and unduly expensive,
but this is about what one would have to do to escape liability under
the NLRA. 33 If the closing is found violative of the NLRA and a
remedy of back pay is ordered, which extends beyond the closing
date, 34 considerable liability can be imposed. This liability would
take precedence over the distribution of assets to the shareholders
who in an individual employer situation are most probably the
officers and directors of the corporation. The individual employer
may be unable to sell his assets, or he may have to unload them at a
loss. He most probably has no outside income to tide him over until
the new business is under way. Suppose he exercises his absolute
right under Darlington but, after he is set up in a new business, a
union begins organizational activity. Will he want to go through
liquidation and run the complete cycle again? The utility of the
35
exercise of the right conferred in Darlington is questionable, at best.
Johannesen's Article on The Darlington Case, 13 LAB. L.J. 356 (1962); Segal.
Comments on the Right of an Employer To Go Out of Business: The Darlington
Case, The Restriction, 4 BosTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL & COMMERCIAL L. REV. 581
(1963); Comments on Board decision: 48 CORNELL L.Q. 572 (1962); 1963 DUKE L.J.
786; 51 GEO. L.J. 633 (1963); 51 ILL. B.J. 588 (1962); 16 STAN. L. REV. 209 (1963);
111 U. PA. L. REV. 672 (1962); 49 VA. L. REV. 616 (1963). Comments on circuit
court decision: 325 F.2d 682 (4th Cir. 1963); 32 FoPDHAM L. REV. 598 (1964);
32 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 904 (1964); 42 TEXAS L. REV. 735 (1964); 25 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 616 (1964).
33. The purchaser, if related to the seller, of the business may be held liable
for carrying out the Board's order under the "successor corporation" doctrine that
operates if there is a change in ownership that is merely a disguised continuance.
Southport Petroleum Co. v. NLRB, 315 U.S. 100 (1942). Continuity is the crucial
question. See NLRB v. Auto Ventshade Inc., 276 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1960); NLRB
v. Part Gibson Veneer & Box Co., 167 F.2d 144 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S.
819 (1948).
34. The Board has recently imposed back-pay liability beyond the date of
total closing or partial discontinuance up to the point where the employee obtains substantially equivalent employment. See, e.g., Savoy Laundry, Inc., 137
N.L.R.B. 306 (1962); Barbers Iron Foundry, 126 N.L.R.B. 30 (1960); Bonnie Lass
Knitting Mills, Inc., 126 N.L.R.B. 1396 (1960).
35. Darlington raises other questions that are beyond the scope of this note.
Is going out of business a mandatory bargaining subject under §8 (a) (5)? A footnote implied that it would not be. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co.
85 Sup. Ct. 994, 998, n.5 (1965). Compare Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. Steelworkers,
Local 1304, 85 Sup. Ct. 398 (1964) (requiring bargaining, regardless of the employer's motivation, where there was partial discontinuance of a plant function),
with the reasoning advanced in Note, Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining-Operational Changes, 17 U. FLA. L. REV. 109, 120 (1964). The other questions that are
prompted by Darlington, which cannot be answered but generate speculation are:
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THE American Ship CAsE

American Ship is the most significant of the three decisions in that
it will have the most far reaching impact on labor-management re-

lations. The case involved the question whether the lockout36 is the
3

corollary of the strike. 7
The company operated four shipyards on the Great Lakes and had
negotiated contracts with the unions on five prior occasions. At the
point of renewing the contract, the unions demanded increased fringe

benefits and wages, but the company contended that competition in
the industry was so intense it could not afford to increase compensa-

tion. After several unproductive meetings, the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service was called in. Two months after bargaining had
begun, the parties separated without reaching agreement. An impasse
had been reached. The company was apprehensive of strikes because
of the union's past history of "quickie" strikes. The company then
laid off some employees, shut down one plant, substantially reduced
another's work force, and left skeletal crews as work in progress was
completed in the other two plants. As a result, the company and the
unions resumed negotiations, obtaining a settlement about two months

later.
The union filed unfair labor practice charges and the Board found

the company's activity to be discriminatory38 The court of appeals
agreed,39 but it was reversed by the Supreme Court, which expressly
40
held:
An employer violates neither section 8 (a) (1) nor section
8 (a) (3) when after a bargaining impasse has been reached, he
temporarily shuts down his plant and lays off his employees
for the sole purpose of bringing economic pressure to bear in
support of his legitimate bargaining position.
(1) could a Board order require resumption of the plant operations, (2) will partial
closing be more strictly viewed than before, and (3) if the activity in Darlington
is found to be violative of the Act because of its purpose and effect on other
employees in the Deering-Milliken complex, will the declaration of one's absolute
right to liquidate be merely dictum?
36. The lockout, as defined at common law, was the shutting down of the
plant, whether there was work to do or not, for the purpose of obtaining some
tactical advantage from the employees. Iron Moulders Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co.,
166 Fed. 45, 52 (7th Cir. 1908).
37. The question presented in Brief for Appellee, p. 2, American Ship Bldg.
Co. v. NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct. 955 (1965).
38. American Ship Bldg. Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 1362 (1963).
39. Local 374, International Bhd. of Boilermakers v. NLRB, 331 F.2d 839
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
40. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct. 955, 967 (1965).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss.
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

3 [1965],
Art. 5
[Vol. XVIII

Taken literally, this is a considerable extension of the employer's
rights in collective bargaining, 41 and arguably supports the contention
that the lockout is the corollary of the strike. Thus the employer
appears to be able to lockout in an offensive manner, that is, he can
determine the time to apply economic pressure. The Board's view
had been that it was solely within the union's power to affect the
4 timing of exerting economic pressure by exercising its right to strike. 2
There have been cases in which the employer was permitted to lockout, for example, to prevent plant seizure threatened by a sit-down
strike 4 3 to avert further severe economic loss to an already marginal
business, 44 and to forestall repetitive disruptions of an integrated operation by "quickie" strikes. 45 Some of these cases occurred in a contract renewal context while others have recognized the employer's
right to temporarily modify or shutdown operations for legitimate
business reasons unconnected with employee union activities protected
4
by the NLRA. 6
Lest one be caught up in the throes of amazement over this new
ammunition in the employer's armory, close attention must be paid
to the facts in American Ship. Specific findings showed an absence
of hostility toward the unions, both in the past and at the time of
this dispute. The employees were rehired on the reaching of an
agreement. No business was conducted during the lockout. There
had been several strikes in the past, some of which were wildcat, that
is, unauthorized by the union. The employer's business was highly
seasonal, and a strike during his busy winter months would have
crippled him. 47 The employer bargained in good faith throughout
the negotiations, making proposals and counter proposals. The
Court was aware of the acute effect of a strike that would immobilize
ships in a vital industry. Each of these factors played an important
part in the result of this case, creating favorable equities in behalf
41. See generally Forkosch, Bargaining and Economic Pressure- The New
Trilogy, 16 LAB. L.J. 323 (1965); Mintz, The Status of the Bargaining Lockout,
39 FLA. B.J. 1073 (1965); Comment, 51 A.B.A.J. 577, 578, 579 (1965).
42. See Utah Plumbing & Heating Contractors Ass'n, 126 N.L.R.B. 973 (1960);
Quaker State Oil Refining Co., 121 N.L.R.B. 334 (1958), which deprived the employer of the right to affect the timing.
43. Link Belt Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 227 (1940).
44. NLRB v. Dalton Brick & Tile Corp., 301 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1962).
45. International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907 (1951).
46. See Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 211 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1954)
(elimination of circulation department and subsequent use of independent contractors); NLRB v. Goodyear Footwear Corp., 186 F.2d 913 (7th Cir. 1951) (adverse economic, climatic, and physical conditions leading to suspension of training);
Pepsi Cola Bottling Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 785 (1964) (lack of heating, lighting, and
toilet facilities lead to shutdown).
47. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct. 955, 960 (1965).
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of the employer. To conclude that the lockout is the corollary of the
strike as a result of this case, is to ignore these important factors. The
presence of strong economic justification more nearly puts American
Ship in the category of activity that the Board has previously approved.:8 Although the Court's holding does not specifically require
the presence of strong economic justification, the facts allow the case
to be cited for this point. The facts also support an argument that
the use of the lockout in a bargaining context should be limited to
a situation in which there exists a past history of wildcat strikes and
severe potential harm. The lockout can now play a bigger role in
labor-management relations, but it is yet to share equal billing on
the theatre marquee with the strike.
THE Brown CAsE

Brown involved a multiemployer bargaining unit that consisted
of five operators of six retail food stores who collectively bargained
on a group basis with the union that represented their respective employees. 49 It was at the stage of contract renewal negotiations that
the dispute arose. Agreement could not be reached on the amount
and effective date of a wage increase. The union voted to strike,
to which the employers responded in a three-musketeer fashion that
a strike against one of the operators would be deemed a strike against
all. The union struck one of the store operators. 50 All the employers
48. See Tidewater Express Lines, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 1111 (1963); Packard Bell
Electronic Corp., 180 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1961); International Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B.
907 (1951); Link Belt Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 227 (1940); Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48
N.L.R.B. 1335 (1943).
49. In 88 Monthly Labor Review, No. 4, April 1965, the advantages of multiemployer bargaining units for both management and labor are stated as: (1)
convenience -enables savings in manpower for both sides rather than bargaining
individually; (2) standardized labor costs-eliminates a single employer having a
competitive advantage plus it inhibits wage cuts by a single employer; (3) stability
-encourages joint effort and teamwork between the parties; (4) uniformity in
contract negotiation and interpretation; and (5) better benefits-allows for an
accumulation of funds and the pooling of resources. Multiemployer bargaining
is most prevalent in industries such as retail food, construction, food processing,
apparel, printing, trucking, warehousing, stevedoring, and hotels. There is a
high degree of mobility in the work force in many of these industries, but the
rapid turnover is cushioned to an extent through the use of multiemployer
bargaining.
50. This is termed a "whipsaw" strike that is effective for the union seeking
capitulation by management. Usually the weakest employer is struck first. He is
the one that can least afford loss of revenue because of hampered operations.
Successive employers are struck individually until they have acceded. The "whipsaw" strike is particularly effective when competition is heavy, and the profit
margin slim, within that industry.
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then locked out the union employees. But rather than close down,
the five operators continued operations using managerial personnel,
relatives, and a few temporary replacements. Five weeks after the
initial strike, bargaining resumed and agreement was reached.
Thereafter, the union filed discriminatory unfair labor practice
charges. The Board held that it was permissible for the struck employer to operate with temporary replacements during the dispute,
but that the other four nonstruck operators could not. 51 The court
of appeals disagreed with the Board.5 2 The Supreme Court affirmed
on the basis that the activity of all the operators was "a measure
reasonably adapted to achievement of a legitimate end-preserving
the integrity of the multi-employer bargaining unit."53
NLRB v. Truck Drivers' Union, Local 449,54 referred to as the
Buffalo Linen case, established the permissibility of a lockout by a
multiemployer unit to preserve the unit. In Buffalo Linen, however,
the employers did not continue to carry on their business. Thus,
Brown is an enlargement of the practical value of a lockout, that is,
maintaining some income to the employer while at the same time
exerting some economic pressure on the union to accede to company
proposals. In this context, the lockout is primarily a defensive tactic,
employed only after a "whipsaw" strike has begun. If the multiemployer unit acted in a retaliatory rather than defensive manner,
the Board has held the lockout to be discriminatory. 5 The Board
found that the employers were trying to enhance their bargaining
position rather than to preserve the unit, and it is doubtful that
Brown would alter that outcome if a similar case were to arise now.

6

Nor has the Board allowed the multiemployer unit to use the lockout as a threat simply to increase the unit's bargaining power. 57 The
lockout has been used in nonbargaining situations, but with little
success, unless convincing economic justification was shown. 58 Brown
will not significantly affect these cases, either.
51. John Brown, 137 N.L.R.B. 73 (1962).
52. NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1963).
53. NLRB v. Brown, 85 Sup. Ct. 980, 987 (1965).
54. 353 U.S. 87 (1957).
55. Bagdad Bowling Alley, 147 NLRB 851 (1964); Kroger Co., 145 NLRB
235 (1963). See Retail Clerks, Local 692 v. Food Fair Stores, Inc., 1964 CCH Lab.
Cas. 118,992 in which a state court refused an injunction to open stores when
employers had shut down and locked out employees.
56. But see text accompanying notes 106-107 infra.
57. American Stores Packing, 142 N.L.R.B. 711 (1963), enforced, NLRB v.
American Stores Packing Co., 58 L.R.R.M. 2635 (10th Cir. 1965). But see NLRB
v. Continental Baking Co., 221 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1955).
58. See, e.g., NLRB v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 340 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1965);
Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 492 (3d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 379 U.S. 841 (1965); New York Mailers Union No. 6 v. NLRB, 327 F.2d
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The Brown case is second in importance to American Ship as far
as practical application to current labor relations. But again the
holding must be viewed with caution. There were significant factors
at play in Brown. It was firmly established that the employers were
friendly toward unions. The temporary replacements were specifically told that their services would not be needed after the whipsaw strike was ended. The business was highly competitive with
repetitive patronage essential to profitability. Although not mentioned by the Court, there also was a problem with spoilage of
perishables. The effect of the use of temporary replacements was
negligible on union security because the striking employees knew
that the replacements were only temporary. The union employees had
it within their power to terminate the whipsaw strike. The union
shop provision had been carried over to the new contract. A further
fact which bolstered the multiemployer unit's position before the
Court was the struck employer's use of temporary rather than permanent replacements. He could have discharged his employees, but he
did not.5" The alteration of any of these facts may cause the Court
to find a multiemployer lockout an unfair labor practice.
EFFECT ON THE ELEMENTS OF SECTION 8 (A) (1) AND SECTION 8 (A)

(3)

Section 8 (a) (1)60 is aimed at employer activity, which impinges
on the employees' rights to organize, to engage in protected concerted
activity, and to bargain collectively with the employer as secured in
section 7 of the Act. Employer activity, which interferes with the
exercise of these rights, is prohibited. The Darlington, American
Ship, and Brown cases cast light on the elements of sections 8 (a) (1)
and 8 (a) (3) violations, but each opinion was written by a different
justice. 6' There were two concurring opinions by former Mr. Justice
Goldberg, joined by Mr. Chief Justice Warren. Mr. Justice White
dissented in Brown and gave a separate concurring opinion in
American Ship. Light has been shed on the area, but in varying degrees of illumination.
In consolidating the three majority opinions, it appears that employer activity, which may be subject to scrutiny under the NLRA,
can be classified as:
292 (2d Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Anchorage Businessmen's Ass'n, 289 F.2d 619 (9th
Cir. 1961).
59. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (right to replace
economic strikers permanently).
60. National Labor Relations Act §8 (a) (1), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §158 (a) (1) (1958).
61. The majority opinions were delivered by Mr. Justice Harlan in Darlington,
Mr. Justice Stewart in American Ship, and Mr. Justice Brennan in Brown.
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(1) inherently destructive of employee rights, which cannot be
justified regardless of motive,
(2) harmful to employee rights, prompted by legitimate business reasons, but where antiunion bias is present, or
(3) harmful to employee rights, prompted by legitimate business reasons, in the absence of antiunion bias.
Activity of the first and second character is violative of section
8 (a) (1), but activity in the third category is permissible. Two main
factors affect the classification: the actual or potential severity of
the action, and the presence or absence of antiunion bias. The
existence of antiunion bias is a fact question evidenced by prior or
contemporaneous actions and statements by the employer. Actual
harm may be apparent from the facts of the case. The Board, however, may assess the potential harm to the exercise of employee rights
in the absence of actual evidence, utilizing its expertise as an administrative tribunal.
Recent examples of activity in the "inherently destructive" category, as established by Supreme Court cases finding section 8 (a) (1)
violations are:
(1) awarding twenty-year superseniority to employees who
62
worked during a strike,
(2) discharging an employee who was an active union organizer
on the basis of hearsay that the employee threatened to use dyna63
mite, when no damage in fact occurred,
(3) discharging of unionized staff with replacement by employees known to be possessed of violent antiunion animus,64 and
(4) discharging only union leaders when many employees have
broken the shop rule.65
In this first category, the Supreme Court has applied the common
law rule that an individual is held to intend the foreseeable consequences of his acts. Thus, specific evidence of employer motivation is
not necessary to establish a violation.06 Even if the employer can
show some valid economic justification, a violation still remains when
the activity is bad enough to be deemed "inherently destructive or
prejudicial." An asserted honest belief in the necessity to discharge
a union organizer to protect persons and property did not overcome
a violation even though it was alleged that the union organizer
62. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
63. NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 379 U.S. 21 (1964).
64. Cf. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
65. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct. 955, 964 (1965) (this
example was stated in the opinion, but is unrelated to the facts of that case).
66. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
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threatened to use dynamite. This rejection of an honest belief as a
defense arose in a section 8 (a) (3) context. 67 For inherently prejudicial
activity, the defense is not available in determining if there existed
86
a section 8 (a) (1) violation, either.
Employer activity, which is harmful to employee section 7 rights,
is permissible only if the employer lacks antiunion bias. 69 Antiunion
bias is unlawful motivation in the eyes of the Court. An inconsistency
exists, however, regarding the degree of antiunion bias which must be
shown to establish a section 8 (a) (1) violation. One statement by the
Court in Brown is rather dear, to the effect that the existence of bias,
per se, will make the activity violative.70 Another statement by the
Court in Darlington implies a preponderance of the evidence test,
balancing section 7 interference with business justification.7 With
the emphasis in American Ship on the lack of antiunion hostility,72
it appears that existence of antiunion bias, regardless of degree, will
establish a violation although the Second Circuit had applied a pre73
ponderating motive test prior to these cases.
The dividing line will be a fact question based on an examination
of all attendant circumstances. A scintilla could be enough to arrive
at an outcome that will effectuate the policy of the Act. The caveat
is clear to the advisor in labor-management affairs.
Section 8 (a) (3)7- makes it an unfair labor practice for the employer to discriminate against his employees because of union activities. The discrimination may affect hiring, terms or conditions of
employment, and it may encourage or discourage membership in a
labor organization. The employer's purpose for engaging in discriminator activity is controlling.75 When a section 8 (a) (3) discriminating violation is found, a section 8 (a) (1) interfering violation
is usually present because of its broader scope. The sections are not
mutually inclusive, however. Interference with employee rights is
not necessarily discrimination against the employees.
Employer activity could again be categorized as inherently prejudicial or harmful, either with or without antiunion bias. The pri67.

Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954) (employer's intent

rejected in light of natural and probable consequences of his acts).
68. NLRB v. Brown, 85 Sup. Ct. 980, 986 (1965).
69. Id. at 984.
70. Id. at 986.
71. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 85 'Sup. Ct. 994, 999
(1965).
72. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct. 955, 962 (1965).
73. NLRB v. Neiderman, 334 F.2d 601, 604 (2d Cir. 1964); NLRB v. Rapid
Bindry, Inc., 293 F.2d 170, 175 (2d Cir. 1961); see 1963 DuKE L.J. 786, 791.
74. National Labor Relations Act §8 (a) (3), as amended, 61 Stat. 140 (1947),

29 U.S.C. §148 (a) (3) (1958).
75. NLRB v. Brown, 85 Sup. Ct. 980, 986 (1965).
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mary inquiry is into the employer's motivation for acting,76 so the
classification is not fully determinative of a section 8 (a) (3) violation.
He may act with antiunion bias and still be protected as in Darlington.77 The activity may be deemed inherently prejudicial and the
Court will apply the common law rule of the employer intending
the foreseeable consequences of his act,7 8 which will supply the motivation and intent. In this area it appears that intent is equated with
motive, a notion that a prosecuting attorney would not accept. But
this is nothing more than a recognition that if the activity is nasty
enough, it will discourage union membership, and thereby discriminate against union participants. Sections 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) have
similar tests for activity of this character. For the less severe activity,
the scope of section 8 (a) (3) looks more to why it came about, whereas
8 (a) (1) looks to the effect of it. For a section 8 (a) (3) violation in the
second or third category there must be "both discrimination and a
resulting discouragement of union membership,' 7 9 with the "added
element of unlawful intent."' ' 0
Mr. Justice White, in his concurring opinion in American Ship
rejected the motivation test s' in favor of the balancing test advocated
by former Mr. Justice Goldberg. Mr. Justice White dissented in
Brown,8 2 his view being that the employer's activity did not outweigh
the interference with the employee's rights. In the opinions of these
three Justices, the effect, rather than the cause, will determine a
violation in the absence of antiunion bias.3 The Brown majority
opinion stated that antiunion bias will convert an otherwise ordinary
business act into an unfair labor practice s4 when speaking of harmful
type activity, but cited a prior Supreme Court case 5 that dealt with
inherently prejudicial activity. For section 8 (a) (3) violations, no
indication is given if the bias must preponderate because in Brown
76. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct. 955, 962 (1965); Local 347,
Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 675 (1960); Radio Officers Union v.
NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 43 (1954).
77. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 85 Sup. Ct. 994 (1965).
78. Local 357, Teamsters Union v. NLRB, 365 U.S. 667, 775 (1960); Radio
Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954).
79. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct. 955, 963 (1965).
80. NLRB v. Brown, 85 Sup. Ct. 980, 985 (1965).
81. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct. 955, 971 (1965).
82. NLRB v. Brown, 85 Sup. Ct. 980, 992 (1965).
83. Mr. Justice Goldberg, concurring in American Ship said, however: "[r]he
correct test ... is whether the business justification for the employer's action outweighs the interference with §7 rights involved." His statement pertained to
§8 (a) (1) violation, but he also said: "A similar test is applicable in §8 (a) (3) cases
where no antiunion motive is shown." American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 Sup.
Ct. 955, 978 (1965).
84. NLRB v. Brown, 85 Sup. Ct. 980, 986 (1965).
85. NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp. 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
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and American Ship the employer's intent for acting was found to be
devoid of hostility toward unions and the collective bargaining process. 86 It appears that the existence of bias will establish a violation,
unless the activity is fundamentally a management prerogative in the
extreme category such as complete liquidation, found permissible in
Darlington. Thus, a close relationship exists between the tests for
sections 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (3) concerning harmful attitude and antiunion bias. This question of the degree of antiunion bias is important to the practitioner when comparing prior cases and Board
decisions to predict permissible activity.
A literal application of these newly formulated tests may expand
the scope of sections 8 (a) (1) and (3). The general reaction to the
three recent cases has been that they have strengthened the employer's
rights, 8 7 but it is conceivable that this expansion will be limited
to these specific factual situations and some formerly permissible
activity will now be violative. The presumption in favor of an employer having a lawful motive,88 may be overcome by an application
of the common law rule of one intending the foreseeable consequences
of his action, which discourages unionization. A violation may result
in the absence of specific evidence of intent, regardless of the employer's honest belief in his need for acting or the amount of business
justification he can put forth.
CAsEs DIEcy

AFFECTED By Darlington,American Ship, AND Brown

No case involving a single employer who liquidated his entire
operations in response to union organizational activity because he
disliked unions has appeared subsequent to Darlington. There have
been, however, Board decisions 9 concerning employers with two or
more plants who sold or closed down a portion of their operations.
The situations fell under the "partial dosing to chill unionism" portion of Darlingtonbecause there was a desire to thwart unionism. The
activity violated the NLRA. 0
In Joseph Weinstein Electric Corporation,91 a single employer
locked out his employees during contract renewal negotiations. The
86. NLRB v. Brown, 85 Sup. Ct. 980, 985 (1965); American Ship Bldg. Co. v.
NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct. 955, 962 (1965).
87. See authorities cited, note 41 supra.
88. NLRB v. Huber & Huber Motor Express, Inc., 223 F.2d 748, 749 (5th
Cir. 1955).
89. Boro Motors, Inc., 153 N.L.R.B. No. 25 (1965); Valley Forge Flag Co., 152
N.L.R.B. No. 150 (1965); Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 152 N.L.R.B. No. 76
(1965).
90. Ibid.
91. 152 N.L.R.B. No. 3 (1965).
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Board decision was rendered nearly a month after the American Ship
decision. The Board found antiunion bias because the employer tried
to get his employees to switch unions. The lockout, lasting only two
days, was classified as a "strong economic wedge to force the employees into a new contract." American Ship had recognized the
utility of a lockout as a bargaining wedge. Although the employer's
interference arguably falls within sections 8 (a) (1) and 8 (a) (2), he
did not dislike unions, per se, but was trying to bring pressure so
that the contract could be modified to enable expansion of his business. The Board's holding of a section 8 (a) (3) violation does not
seem warranted on the facts that appear in the decision. In Body &
Tank Corporation v. NLRB 92 the Second Circuit set aside a Board
order that had found the employer's use of a lockout to further his
bargaining position violative of the NLRA, American Ship clearly
controlled on the facts of that case.
The Board has followed Brown by dismissing a complaint that also
93
involved a multiemployer unit in the retail food industry.
In the multiemployer situation, however, an inconsistency has
developed. A group of druggists locked out their employees after the
union had struck. They continued operations. The District of
Columbia Circuit Court had reserved 94 decision pending the Brown
outcome. After the Brown decision the court deleted that portion of
the order that required the employer to cease and desist from the
lockout but did not disturb that part of the order that required back
pay to the employees during the lockout that lasted almost two
months. 95 Brown grants the right to defensively lockout and continue
operations. Why must the employer be held liable for back pay, an
8 (a) (3) remedy, for exercising a valid right? If this is so, then the
right to lock out is purely illusory. The union is certainly not responsible to the employer for lost profits when it engages in protected
activity.
CONCLUSION

The three cases, Darlington, Brown, and American Ship, have expanded the permissible self-help economic measures for the employer. 96 This new ammunition is more of the .22 caliber variety
92. 344 F.2d 330 (2d Cir. 1965).
93. Food Giant Super Mkts., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 8 (1965).
94. Retail Clerks Local 381 v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
95. Retail Clerks Local 381 v. NLRB, 348 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
96. While this point has been alluded to earlier, three recent commentaries
on the lockout cases, American Ship and Brown, mutually agree that the important
questions to be resolved in future cases for a single employer are: can he lock
out before an impasse and, if so, can he then operate with temporary replace-
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than the .357 magnum, however. The cases have their limitations
and, in view of their factual background, they are susceptible to distinction and manipulation. The Board has applied these cases strictly and will most probably continue to do so.7 The guides that have
been set out for sections 8(a)(1) and 8 (a)(3) violations are heavily
subjective, limiting the degree of predictability for future cases. Antiunion bias may be found as the result of one casual statement by a
supervisor. The distinction between antiunion bias and whether the
advent of unionization may be a valid economic factor for the employer to consider could turn on one utterance.
The replacement of employees during a temporary shutdown is
apparently going to be limited to temporary replacement. 9 The
employer may recall his employees, however, and then permanently
replace those who do not return.99 Replacement is a vital issue to
the unions. Loss of seniority and other attendant rights is feared
more than a temporary layoff. Union strike funds cushion the latter.
The contention that a lockout would reduce all employees to the
status of economic strikers, subject to permanent replacement, was
seriously questioned by the Tenth Circuit in Brown.100 The Supreme
Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's opinion without specifically passing on that contention. Activity that is initially contemplated as
economic may well be converted into unfair labor practice activity,
which would bar the right of replacement. 10 1 An employer's attempt
to permanently replace the employees he has locked out may be
02
enough to classify the activity as discriminatory.
ments? Other questions are raised, some pertinent, but some are too speculative
or represent employer wishful thinking. Compare Mintz, The Status of the
Bargaining Lockout, 39 FLA. B.J. 1073, 1075 (1965); Address by NLRB Chairman
McColloch, Annual Conference of Texas Industry, 60 LAB. REL. REP. No. 17, 145,
149, News & Background Information (Nov. 1, 1965); Address by Prof. Oberer,
12th Annual Inst. on Labor Law, 60 LAB. REL. RP. No. 19, 159, 160, News &
Background Information (Nov. 8, 1965).
97. See cases cited note 89, supra; Joseph Weinstein Elec. Corp., 152 N.L.R.B.
No. 3 (1965).
98. Mr. Justice White, dissenting in Brown, feared that the majority opinion

opened the door for the allowance of permanent replacement of the locked out
employees, but a clear implication to the contrary can be found in a footnote in
the majority opinion. NLRB v. Brown, 85 Sup. Ct. 980, 989 n.6 (1965). See American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 955, 962 n.8 (1965) in which another caveat is implied should an employer attempt to utilize the Mackay Radio doctrine in a lockout context.
99. Packard Bell Electronics, 130 N.L.R.B. 1122 (1961) (dictum).
100. NLRB v. Brown, 319 F.2d 7, 11 (10th Cir. 1963).
101. See Rothman, The Right To Go Out of Business Together With a
Consideration of Plant Removal, Subcontracting, and the Duty To Bargain, 6
BosroN COL.JGE, INDUSTRIAL & COMMERCIAL L. Rav. 1, 20 (1964).
102. See Comment, 76 HARv. L. REy. 1494, 1497 (1963).
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Although some circuit courts have regarded the lockout as the
corollary of the strike, 10 3 that is far from the truth. One of the questions in the brief for certiorari by American Ship Building Company
was whether the right to lock out was the corollary of the right to
strike,' 0 4 but this question was not specifically answered by the Supreme Court. The Court did say that the "use of the lockout solely in
support of a legitimate bargaining position"105 is not inconsistent with
the right to strike. In this narrow application it may be the corollary,
but the existence of antiunion hostility will destroy the equability
of the right to lockout. 10 6
Merging the reasoning of Brown and American Ship, multiemployer bargaining units should also be allowed the right to use the
lockout as a bargaining tactic in an offensive manner, without waiting
for the union to strike. Also, the single employer should be able to
operate with temporary replacements, at least, after he has begun the
lockout to strengthen his bargaining position. Neither application
would distort or jeopardize labor and management rights. The Supreme Court, however, recently reiterated the goal of the NLRA to
be the resolution of issues through peaceful negotiation.107 Work
stoppages by strikes and lockouts are not desirable from a nationwide
point of view because of their deterrent effect on the economy; witness the longshoremen and steel industry situations. The New York
newspaper strikes have inconvenienced the inhabitants of that city.
History has shown that work stoppages are inevitable. Negotiation alone cannot resolve all disputes. Management should not be
denied the right to use equivalent tactics because in the long run
both sides would benefit. Without our trained armed forces and
world trade influence, could the United States presume to effect
settlements with, much less approach Soviet Russia in international
matters? The question answers itself, yet is illustrative of the necessity for bargaining entities to have in reserve effective options to
encourage settlement.
LEO

P. RoCK,

JR.

103. Leonard v. NLRB, 197 F.2d 435 (9th Cir. 1952); Morand Bros. Beverage
Co., 204 F.2d 529 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 909 (1953); see generally Denbo,
Is the Lockout the Corollary of the Strike?, 14 LAB. L.J. 400 (1963).
104. Brief for Appellant, p. 2, American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct.

955 (1965).
105. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 85 Sup. Ct. 955, 963 (1965).
106. Id. at 963, 977-79. This qualification is important, and a statement of
the pure holding without it may be misleading. See Mintz, The Status of the
Bargaining Lockout, 39 FLA. B.J. 1073, 1074 (1965).

107.
(1964).

Fibreboard Paper Prods. v. Steelworkers, Local 1304, 85 Sup. Ct. 398, 403
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